With this concise book, Richard Bruegmann sheds much needed light on a subject of nearly universal repugnance only to discover a social and urban phenomenon that has defied both prediction and control.

The immanently readable narrative is a stream of revelations that stand conventional wisdom on its head: sprawl is neither a recent phenomenon nor is it worsening, for examples. While hard to swallow, he backs up his assertions with considerable evidence and solid logic.

In fact, much of what we assume about sprawl is based, Bruegmann argues, on where we are observing the phenomenon from. Indeed if there is one clear theme running throughout the work it is sprawl is the result of those who wish to have the same choices and possibilities in their lives that anti-sprawl advocates enjoyed a few years previously.

The multiple case studies of anti-sprawl regulatory efforts are hardly encouraging. The author identifies three significant periods of anti-sprawl agitation, noticeably coinciding with economic expansion. He also convincingly argues that virtually all of the sprawl in the US can be attributed to population growth and the lowering of the number of people in households, not wasteful use of space.

If the effort of sprawl opponents is to force development at higher densities, there are very few successful programs to illustrate how. With actual density figures, Bruegmann points out that Los Angeles is a lesser problem (i.e. higher urban density) than Little Rock or Lubbock.

Marking the history of anti-sprawl efforts reinforces the conclusion that the alarm is overwrought and tied to other social mores. Sharply defined city-rural boundaries are a holdover from walled cities and defensive planning. They are also evocative of a structured society with clear class distinctions. Sprawl disrupts both neat patterns.

Bruegmann’s choice of words for sprawl critics – “highbrow”, “high-minded”, “entrenched” – betrays his sentiments. Sometimes he is simply blunt:

Predictably, every time this has occurred, in the judgment of certain well-established groups, the newcomers have made the “wrong choices”. Also predictably, criticism of sprawl has virtually always been aimed at people outside the speaker’s or writer’ own circle.

Nor has Europe been as successful preventing sprawl as we often imagine from downtown city centers. As Bruegmann shows on density graphs, they have simply been lagging due to WW II damage. Cities cited as examples of compact growth, such as Hamburg, often have extenuating factors – in this case, a stagnant population. Indeed, if economic growth is desirable, wealth will enable more families to acquire the space formerly available only to the wealthy.

Places where urban planning has undoubtedly worked like Moscow are hardly attractive models. Even the fabled “Portland solution” produced arbitrary winners and losers among developers and simply pushed growth just outside arbitrary boundaries.

It would be reductionist to simply state that Bruegmann sees no problem with sprawl. He clearly points out problems of congestion and aesthetics, but wisely also demonstrates that today’s appalling subdivision will likely be a cherished neighborhood 40 years hence, simply due to maturing trees.

He offers distinct hope for the future by delineating how urban densities likely are beginning to rise already, fueled by gentrification and market forces. The staggering wealth of upper class citizens allows them to live at high densities while mitigating the effects. His vision of urban centers is equally provocative, “It is entirely possible that some attractive central cities will become essentially resort areas filled with second homes”.

Sprawl is a historic, logical response of free citizens to increasing wealth. As Bruegmann points out, to avoid it we must either deny have-nots freedom or prosperity, or both.

FUI (Farmer Usefulness Index, 1=useless, 10= crucial) = 9
Buy or borrow = Borrow (unless paperback)
(301 pages, hardback, $17.33 at amazon.com)

Labels: culture, economics